CVE-2026-31533
mediumCVSS v3 Base Score
5.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
EPSS Score
0.0%
Exploitation probability in 30 days
Top 86% most likely to be exploited
Attack Characteristics
Attack Vector
Local
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High
Published: April 23, 2026 (78 days ago)
Last Modified: April 23, 2026
Vendor: Red Hat
Source: REDHAT
Vulnerability Report
Generated by CyberWatcher
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/tls: fix use-after-free in -EBUSY error path of tls_do_encryption
The -EBUSY handling in tls_do_encryption(), introduced by commit
859054147318 ("net: tls: handle backlogging of crypto requests"), has
a use-after-free due to double cleanup of encrypt_pending and the
scatterlist entry.
When crypto_aead_encrypt() returns -EBUSY, the request is enqueued to
the cryptd backlog and the async callback tls_encrypt_done() will be
invoked upon completion. That callback unconditionally restores the
scatterlist entry (sge->offset, sge->length) and decrements
ctx->encrypt_pending. However, if tls_encrypt_async_wait() returns an
error, the synchronous error path in tls_do_encryption() performs the
same cleanup again, double-decrementing encrypt_pending and
double-restoring the scatterlist.
The double-decrement corrupts the encrypt_pending sentinel (initialized
to 1), making tls_encrypt_async_wait() permanently skip the wait for
pending async callbacks. A subsequent sendmsg can then free the
tls_rec via bpf_exec_tx_verdict() while a cryptd callback is still
pending, resulting in a use-after-free when the callback fires on the
freed record.
Fix this by skipping the synchronous cleanup when the -EBUSY async
wait returns an error, since the callback has already handled
encrypt_pending and sge restoration.
CWE
CWE-763Affected Products
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9